This paper reviews some of the econometrics problems faced when estimating a rational addiction model of Becker and Murphy (1988) using panel data. This is illustrated with three empirical applications. The …rst application looks at cigarette consumption using macro panel data on American states over time (see Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001)). The second application looks at liquor consumption using macro panel data on American states over time (see Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2002)). The third application uses micro panel data on Russian alcohol consumption (see Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) ).
There is no doubt that econometrics is subject to important limitations, which stem largely from the incompleteness of the economic theory and the non-experimental nature of economic data. But these limitations should not distract us from recognizing the fundamental role that econometrics has come to play in the development of economics as a scienti…c discipline. It may not be possible conclusively to reject economic theories by means of econometric methods, but it does not mean that nothing useful can be learned from attempts at testing particular formulations of a given theory against (possible) rival alternatives. Pesaran (1990, pp. 25-26) 1 INTRODUCTION Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1988) proposed an elegant theory of rational addiction which has been used to explain addiction to cigarettes, alcohol, ca¤eine, illicit drugs, opium, cocaine, etc. The theoretical model assumes forward-looking, utility maximizing consumers who may become addicted to the consumption of a good. Consumers are rational in that they anticipate the expected future consequences of their current actions.
They may recognize the addictive nature of their choices but decide to make them because the gains from the activity exceed the costs of possible future addiction. In particular, the more a person drinks alcohol or smokes cigarettes, the higher the current utility derived.
However, the individual recognizes that he or she is building up a stock of this addictive good that is harmful. The individual rationally trades o¤ these factors to determine the appropriate level of drinking or smoking. This is in contrast to prior 'myopic' theories of habit formation where current utility depended only on past and current consumption of the addictive good, see Pollak (1970 Pollak ( , 1976 . The myopic consumer ignores the possibility that his or her current choices would a¤ect future tastes or health.
This theory is not without its critics; for example, Winston (1980) argues that addicts in this model are happy, which is inconsistent with observed regret among addicts. Akerlof (1991) argues that addicts in this model choose to become addicts and there is no scope for curbing their addictions with education programs, which is incompatible with any role for information and public policy. However, Orphanides and Zervos (1995) provide a rational theory of addiction with learning and regret that resolves some of these criticisms. The basic idea is to allow for uncertainty rather than perfect foresight and a process of learning through experimentation. Their theory explains how individuals can be voluntarily drawn into a harmful addiction and later regret it. Gruber and Köszegi (2001) question the 'time consistent preferences'assumption required by the Becker and Murphy (1988) theory. Dropping this time consistent preferences assumption still yields forward-looking behavior but strikingly di¤erent normative policy implications.
The Becker and Murphy (1988) theory has been applied to the consumption of cigarettes, (see Chaloupka (1991) , Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) , Labeaga (1993 Labeaga ( , 1999 , Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) , Gruber and Köszegi (2001) and Jones and Labeaga (2003) to mention a few); to the consumption of alcohol, (see Grossman, Chaloupka and Sirtalan (1998) and Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2002) and Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) ); to the consumption of ca¤eine, (see Olekalns and Bardsley (1996) ); cocaine, (see ); illicit drugs, (see Sa¤er and Chaloupka (1999) ) and opium, (see Liu, et al. (1999) ). A key feature of this theory is that consumption of an addictive good will depend on future, as well as, past consumption. Finding future consumption statistically signi…cant is a rejection of the myopic model of consumption behavior.
THE RATIONAL ADDICTION MODEL
Following Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) , denoted by BGM, the consumer's problem is to maximize the sum of lifetime utility discounted at rate r:
(1) where = 1=(1 + r), C t is the quantity of cigarettes consumed in period t, Y t is the consumption of a composite commodity in period t, and e t re ‡ects the impact of unmeasured life-cycle variables on utility. BGM take the composite commodity Y as the numeraire and the rate of interest is assumed to be equal to the rate of time preference. This maximization is subject to the following constraints:
where P t is the price of cigarettes at period t, C o is the initial condition indicating the level of cigarette consumption at period zero, and A o is the present value of wealth. The associated …rst-order conditions are the usual marginal utility of wealth w is equal to marginal utility of other consumption in each period U y :
U y (C t ; C t 1 ; Y t; e t ) = w:
Also, marginal utility of current cigarette consumption U 1 plus the discounted marginal e¤ect on next period's utility of today's consumption, U 2 , equals the current price multiplied by the marginal utility of wealth,
Assuming the utility function is quadratic and solving the …rst-order conditions for C t , BGM obtain the following …rst-di¤erence equation:
where
The lower case letters denote the coe¢ cients of the quadratic utility function. Equation (3) gives current cigarette consumption as a function of past and future cigarette consumption, P t and the unobservable shift variables e t and e t+1 : The latter variables re ‡ect the impact of unmeasured life cycle variables. BGM recognize that the unobservable errors e t that a¤ect the utility in each period are likely to be serially correlated. Even if these variables are uncorrelated, e t directly a¤ects utility in each period and a¤ects consumption at all dates through the optimizing equation (3). Therefore, BGM treat C t 1 and C t+1 as endogenous and use lagged and future prices as instruments. Ferguson (2000) . A saddle point solution, however, does require that the roots be real, and in that context, this condition is useful and has to be checked. For the U.S. state cigarette data considered by BGM, the roots are real and the long-run price elasticity is larger than the short-run price elasticity in absolute value as predicted by the theory. Some of the troubling results obtained by BGM that are in con ‡ict with the rational addiction theory were the negative interest rates ranging from -81% to -88% (see their Table 5 ). This occurred when BGM excluded future price, P t+1 ; from the set of instruments. BGM …nd that a Hausman (1978) test rejects the hypothesis that future price values like P t+1 ; are legitimate instruments, but nevertheless argue for its use. BGM justify their choice of P t+1 as an instrument even though it fails the Hausman test, on several grounds. First, BGM reason that using only past prices yield poor instruments, which in turn can produce a large bias in the estimated coe¢ cients of the endogenous variables. This is the weak IV story (see Nelson and Startz (1990) ).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Second, BGM argue that using P t+1 as an instrument yields more robust estimates against slight misspeci…cation of the demand equation than instrumental variables estimators that omit P t+1 . Finally, they argue that consumers may have relevant information to forecast future cigarette prices. For example, tax hikes are announced in advance and it is plausible that consumers anticipate the price increase well in advance. Even with using P t+1 as an instrument, the positive implied interest rate ranges between 56% and 223%.
Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) consider a variant of (3) as follows:
where the subscript i denotes the i-th state (i = 1,..,46) and the subscript t denotes the t-th We follow the usual convention of assuming that the disturbance term in equation (4) is speci…ed as a two-way error component model: 
where i denotes a state-speci…c e¤ect, t denotes a year-speci…c e¤ect, and it is a remainder disturbance. One of the advantages of a panel is its ability to control for all time-invariant variables or state-invariant variables, whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical cross-section or time series study. Both e¤ects can be assumed either …xed or random.
We assume that the time-period e¤ects (the t 's) are …xed parameters to be estimated as coe¢ cients of time dummies (D t ) for each year in the sample. This can be justi…ed given the numerous policy interventions, as well as, health warnings and Surgeon General's reports which previous studies accounted for using time dummy variables, (see Baltagi and Levin (1986) by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) , Arellano and Bond (1991) and Keane and Runkle (1992) .
BGM relied solely upon the …xed e¤ects 2SLS estimator using two sets of instrumental variables (IV) estimators. The …rst IV estimator uses lagged prices [P t 1 ; P t 2 ] among the set of instruments. The second IV estimator adds future prices [P t+1 ] to the set of instruments.
However, it is important to emphasize that the …xed e¤ects 2SLS estimator is inconsistent for …xed T, since the regressors include lagged and future values of the dependent variable. Note that the bias in the …xed e¤ects estimator can be small when T is large and the processes are weakly dependent. In response to the problems with FE2SLS, GMM estimators were developed that exploit the numerous orthogonality conditions between P t and u t . In fact, if P t is uncorrelated with u t for all t = 1,..,T, then in principle, all prices [P 1 ; P 2 ; ::; P T ] should be used as instruments for each time period. In this case, one …rst di¤erences (4) to get rid of state speci…c unobservable e¤ects. The resulting equation is:
Note that if P t is uncorrelated with u s for all t,s = 1,2,..,T, one gets the following moment conditions:
where W i is a block diagonal matrix with [P i1 ; P i2 ; ::; P iT ] in each block. Also, i denotes the i-th state and u i is the disturbance vector for that state with u 0 i = (u i1 ; u i2 ; ::; u iT ). Additional orthogonality restrictions are obtained assuming strict or weak exogeneity of Y it and P n it . These are also included in W performing GLS on (6) after premultiplying it by W 0 . Using standard assumptions on the initial observation, one can obtain additional moment conditions that could lead to more e¢ cient GMM estimators, see Ahn and Schmidt (1995) , Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) .
It is not clear that more instruments of this nature provide better estimators, especially when N is relatively small (N=46) and T is relatively large (T=30) by micro panel standards.
In fact, Ziliak (1997) showed that GMM may perform better with suboptimal instruments and argued against exploiting all moments in panel data GMM estimation. With T=30, there are too many orthogonality conditions to use. Hence, Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) consider a subset of these orthogonality restrictions, testing their validity using the Sargan over-identi…cation test.
An alternative method of dealing with predetermined instruments was proposed by Keane and Runkle (1992) . Using the forward …ltering idea from the time series literature to get rid of the serial correlation in the disturbances allows one to use the original predetermined set of instruments. The general variance-covariance matrix across time P can be estimated using the …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS residuals obtained from (6), i.e.,
where b u i;F D2SLS is the (T-1) 1 vector of …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS residuals for state i. Then one premultiplies (6) by Cholesky's decomposition of the inverse of this variance-covariance matrix P 1 replicated for each cross-section, i.e., by Q = I N P; where P = Cholesky of c P 1 F D . Finally, 2SLS is performed on the forward …ltered model using the original set of instruments. This method of estimating dynamic panel data models has been shown to perform well in Monte Carlo experiments by Ziliak (1997) . This estimator, like the GMM estimator, is consistent and has the advantage of being able to account for any arbitrary serial correlation as implied by equation (3). give more reasonable estimates than BGM's …xed e¤ects 2SLS estimator given in their Table   5 , model (i). In BGM, the estimated coe¢ cient of C t 1 is negative, the estimated coe¢ cient of P t is positive and both are insigni…cant. This is why BGM recommended future price as an IV. Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) , on the other hand, …nd a positive and signi…cant coe¢ -cient estimate of C t 1 con…rming that smoking is addictive. Also, a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient estimate of C t+1 ; rejecting the myopic model and supporting the forward looking consumer without including future price to the set of instruments. Using the Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) formulas used to compute the short-run and long-run price elasticities, one obtains the short-run price elasticity from:
and the long-run price elasticity from:
The corresponding elasticities are evaluated at the means of the data. BGM's implied elasticities from their FE2SLS estimator are -0.66 and -0.56, respectively, which are in con ‡ict with the implications of the theory. These are compared with -0.69 and -1.38, the implied price elasticities from Baltagi and Gri¢ n's (2001) FE2SLS. BGM's implied interest rate estimate (from their FE2SLS estimator) is -225%, whereas the implied interest rate from the FE2SLS estimator in Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) is 41%. Despite the fact that the latter estimates are plausible, the standard error is large 1.16, implying an unreliable estimate of this discount rate that includes zero and negative values in its con…dence interval.
Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) then add P t+1 to the set of instruments as in BGM. The estimated coe¢ cients of C t 1 are uniformly positive and statistically signi…cant ranging between 0.24 and 0.50. Again, this con…rms the addictive e¤ects of smoking. The estimated coe¢ cients of C t+1 are also positive and statistically signi…cant ranging between 0.16 and 0.38. The short-run price elasticity at the sample mean ranges between -0.42 and -0.69 whereas the long-run price elasticity ranges between -0.56 and -2.04. All of the estimators yield positive estimates of the interest rate ranging from 32% to 84%. However, these estimates have large standard errors.
To summarize, the Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) paper provides empirical support for the rational addiction model that relies on a …xed e¤ects 2SLS estimator with future prices included in the instrument set. Even then, the estimates of the interest rate were positive but seemed implausibly large, ranging from 56% to 223%. Exclusion of P t+1 from the set of instruments yielded negative interest rates and preverse signs on lagged consumption and own price. Furthermore, Hausman's test for the consistency of instrumental variables estimators using P t+1 as instruments was decisively rejected. Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) argue that before the RA model can be widely accepted, plausible and statistically signi…cant estimates of the implied discount rate are needed. Based on BGM and the Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2001) results, aggregate panel data do not seem likely to provide sharp estimates of the discount rate. They conjectured that a more promising approach may be to estimate this RA model with micro-panel data as in Chaloupka (1991) but hopefully with samples much longer than T=3. In fact, Chaloupka (1991) Let us now turn to other empirical applications of the rational addiction model. Olekalns and Bardsley (1996) test rational addiction to ca¤eine using annual (time series) data on co¤ee consumption for the U.S. over the period . Imposing an annual discount rate of 0:10, they …nd support for the rational addiction theory with signi…cant coe¢ cients on lagged and future consumption. However, their long-run price elasticity has the wrong sign. Imposing prior, so called, reasonable estimates of the discount rate, is not a legitimate, nor scienti…cally acceptable, answer to the problem of negative estimates of the discount rate. In this day and age of abundant panel micro and macro panel data, one has to estimate this discount rate from the model. Grossman, Chaloupka and Sirtalan (1998) used surveys of high school seniors as part of the monitoring of the future research program to test the rational addiction hypothesis for liquor consumption. Consumption is measured as the number of drinks of alcohol consumed in the past year. The price variable is that of a six-pack of beer. Grossman, Chaloupka and Sirtalan (1998) …nd support for the rational addiction theory rather than the myopic theory of addiction. They report negative and signi…cant price e¤ects, positive and signi…cant future consumption e¤ects, and a long-run price elasticity that is approximately 60% larger than the short-run price elasticity. However, Grossman, Chaloupka and Sirtalan (1998, p.46) report that their estimates are not fully consistent with rational addiction because their estimates of the discount factor were negative and implausibly high, yielding interest rates in the range of -20% to -60%. They conclude that these results, along with the detailed analysis of Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) , suggest that the data on alcohol consumption or cigarette They con…rm that opium is addictive, but …nd no support for the rational addiction model. The short-run and long-run price elasticities for opium are estimated at -0.48 and -1.38, respectively. Auld and Grootendorst (2004) critique the empirical application of rational addiction models using aggregate data showing that non-addictive commodities, such as milk, eggs and oranges, can be found to be rationally addictive. Brettville-Jensen (1999) examines the rational addiction theory assumptions of interpersonal variation and stability in time preferences based on the behaviour of three groups of people: drug users, nondrug users, and former drug users. This study …nds that active injectors of heroin and amphetamine have a higher discount rate than a group of non-users. However, this study also …nds that the discount rate among active and former users di¤ers signi…cantly, which is not supportive of the stability assumption. This questions whether a high time-preference rate leads to addiction or whether the onset of addiction itself alters people's inter-temporal equilibrium.
3.2 The U.S. Liquor Data Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2002) . Their results …nd some of the implications of the rational addiction hypothesis satis…ed for liquor consumption in the U.S. However, these results are sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity across states and su¤er from unreasonable estimates of the discount rate. For their empirical implementation, C it is per capita consumption of liquor (measured in gallons of distilled spirits per head) by persons drinking age (16 years and older). P it is the average retail price of 750 ml of This does not imply that New Hampshire residents are heavy drinkers. Carlson (1985, p.31) reports that "about 55% of New Hampshire's 155 million in annual liquor sales is to out of state tipplers."
Allowing the coe¢ cients of equation (4) all of the coe¢ cients of C t 1 and C t+1 are signi…cant and positive rejecting the myopic model in favor of the rational addiction model. Pesaran and Smith (1995) suggest averaging these heterogeneous estimates to obtain a pooled estimator. The implied short-run and long-run liquor price elasticity estimates at the mean of the data are 0:52 and 1:39, respectively, and the implied interest rate for the mean estimates is 6%. The mean neighboring price e¤ect is positive and signi…cant while the mean real per capita income e¤ect is small and insigni…cant. Baltagi and Gri¢ n (2002) This yields a rejection of the null of no serial correlation in 41 out of 42 cases at the 5% level. Recently, Auld and Grootendorst (2004) argued that time series data are generally insu¢ cient to di¤erentiate true rational addiction from serial correlation.
Allowing the coe¢ cients of equation (4) This evidence is in favor of the rational addiction model and against the myopic model.
The implied interest rate for the mean estimates is 1:8% and the implied short and long-run liquor price elasticity estimates at the mean are 0:31 and 1:62, respectively.
Assuming the coe¢ cients of equation (4) do not vary over time or states one can pool the data and run 2SLS with …xed e¤ects for states and years. Following BGM, the …xed e¤ects 2SLS estimates using P , P n t ; and Y t and their lagged and future values as instruments yields coe¢ cient estimates of C t 1 and C t+1 that are signi…cant and positive, rejecting the myopic model. The implied short and long-run liquor price elasticity estimates at the mean of the data are 0:10 and 1:24, respectively. The implied interest rate estimate is 150%. The range of short-run and long-run liquor price elasticity estimates were not that sensitive to the homogeneity versus heterogeneity assumption, but the estimates of the interest rate were very sensitive to this assumption. The unreasonable estimates of the discount rate. The implied interest rates were negative for the heterogeneous state by state model, small and positive for the 2SLS heterogeneous year by year model and large and positive for the homogeneous model. However, it should be emphasized that none of these interest rates were signi…cant. The empirical evidence in support of the rational addiction theory were: (i) The signi…cance of future, as well as, lagged consumption for both heterogeneous and homogeneous rational addiction models. Also, (ii) the persistent and robust evidence of smaller short-run, rather than long-run, liquor price elasticities for both homogeneous and heterogeneous models. The policy implications from the latter results are that there is scope for raising revenues from increasing liquor taxes in the short-run. However, these gains in tax revenue are short lived since the long-run elasticity is larger than one. This also means that taxes are an e¤ective weapon as a social control device to reduce consumption of alcohol in the long-run.
The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey Data
Alcohol consumption in Russia is legendary and has been reported to be the third leading cause of death in the former Soviet Union after heart disease and cancer, see the Economist (1989). In 1985, President Mikhail Gorbachev initiated an anti-drinking campaign that reduced the production of vodka and cognac, set the minimum legal drinking age at 21, prohibited the sale of beverages in public places, restricted the hours of sale and the number of sales outlets, increased the price, prohibited advertising, prosecuted home distillers, developed anti-alcohol programs, and introduced a policy of intolerance to drinking in the workplace. A more recent campaign to raise the tax rate on alcohol by 40% in 2000 provoked long lines outside distilleries and prompted regional governments to refuse to implement the new taxes, fearing civil disobedience. Are Russian alcohol consumers rational addicts? Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) used eight rounds of a nationally representative Russian survey, spanning the period 1994-2003, to estimate a rational addiction model for alcohol consumption. This is done in a panel data setting, as well as on a wave by wave basis. They do not …nd support for the RA model in Russia for women. For men, the results are supportive of several implications of the RA model, but overall, they fail to endorse the model empirically on grounds of implausible negative estimates of the discount rate. C it is consumption of alcohol (measured in grams of alcohol consumed per day). P it is the real price of alcohol described below. Y it is real household income and in equation (3) additional variables Z it were included covering a vector of demographic characteristics for the i-th individual at time t.
The Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) study is based on phase II of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). This is a nationally representative survey designed to measure the e¤ects of Russian reforms.
2 It used rounds 5 to 12 of the RLMS spanning the period 1994-2003. This is a rich data set with detailed information on alcohol consumption, demographics, education, income, health, occupation, and region of residence. For model estimation, Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) restrict the sample to respondents who were at least 18 years old, drank alcohol, and completed at least three successive interviews.
Alcohol consumption involves various types of alcoholic beverages. Each respondent was asked to state how many grams of beer, wine, forti…ed wine, home-made liquor, vodka and other hard liquor, and other alcohol they usually drank per day over the last 30 days. From this we constructed two di¤erent measures of alcohol consumption: the …rst is a simple additive measure, and the second is a weighted average adjusted for pure alcohol content. Prices for alcohol came from the community …les of the RLMS. Maximum and minimum prices for certain food items and alcohol are sampled at the community level. All prices are transformed into real values using the monthly consumer price index obtained from Goskomstat (Statistics Russia). Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) used minimum prices for vodka, beer, forti…ed wine, and table wine to construct a weighted alcohol price measure. Naturally, prices for home made liquor and other types of unspeci…ed alcohol are not known and cannot be incorporated in the alcohol price measure. This is unfortunate, as it is well documented that consumers substitute home made liquor for branded alcohol as alcohol prices rise.
In Russia the o¢ cial minimum age for purchasing and drinking alcohol is 18 years. However, respondents as young as 14 years reported drinking alcohol. Fifty-three percent of all respondents in our sample drink alcohol. Among men, the frequency of respondents who reported drinking alcohol is 66%, which is signi…cantly higher than the 44% share among women. The pro…le of a male drinker shows that, on average, male drinkers are older (41) than non-drinkers (39). They are more likely to be married (67% as compared to 54%).
They are also less likely to have children (53% as compared to 57%) and less likely to be foreigners (16% as compared to 23%). Controlling for three levels of education, drinkers are less likely to have a primary education (15%) than non-drinkers (25%). Drinkers are more likely to hold higher ranking occupations (like managers, o¢ cials, technicians) than nondrinkers (25% as compared to 21%). Men who drink on average have higher real household income than men who do not drink. Unemployment is signi…cantly less prevalent among drinkers (15%) than among non-drinkers (19%). Male drinkers are more likely to have a higher body mass index (24.9) than non-drinkers (24.2), i.e., they are slightly more likely to be overweight. In addition, male drinkers are signi…cantly more likely to smoke than non-drinkers (67% as compared to 43%).
For women, a slightly di¤erent picture emerges. On average, women who drink are signi…cantly younger (40) than women who do not drink (48). They are more likely to be married (55% as compared to 45%). They are more likely to have children (54% as compared to 48%) and less likely to be foreigners (14% as compared to 20%). Among three levels of education, the same pattern emerges for women as for men. The frequency of primary education among drinkers is signi…cantly lower (12%) than that among non-drinkers (32%).
Also, women who drink are more likely to have higher occupational placement (51% as compared to 46%). Women who drink have signi…cantly higher real household income than woman who do not drink. Like men, unemployment is less widespread among women who drink as compared to women who do not drink (12% as compared to 14%). Unlike men, women who drink are slightly less likely to be overweight than women who do not drink (with body mass index 26.2 compared to 26.9). Like men, women who drink are also signi…cantly more likely to smoke than women who do not drink (20% as compared to 6%).
Turning to the quantity of alcohol that the individual drinks, male drinkers, on average, drink more than twice as much alcohol as female drinkers (887 grams of alcohol per day compared to 413). This remains the case even after we adjust for pure alcohol content (168 grams of alcohol content compared to 67). Since women di¤er substantially from men in the frequency and amount of alcohol consumed, Baltagi and Geishecker (2006) The coe¢ cient of lead consumption is also insigni…cant. Including dummy variables for each individual in this IV regression, (i.e., applying …xed e¤ects IV, as done by Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) ), results in an insigni…cant F-statistic on the joint signi…cance of the individual dummies. For this data set, it seems that controlling for the problem of endogeneity of lead and lagged consumption is more important than controlling for individual heterogeneity. Nevertheless, they report the …xed e¤ects IV regressions. The full sample 4 Regional variations in ethnic composition and cultural traditions across Russia translate into regional variations in alcohol consumption, see Simpura and Levin (1997) . 5 Individual prices of beer and vodka are used as instruments. The maximum number of lags used is three.
results yield an insigni…cant coe¢ cient estimate of lagged consumption and a signi…cant coe¢ cient estimate of lead consumption. Price is also signi…cant, while income is not. This rejects the myopic model in favor of future looking consumers, but the implied interest rate is negative. The results are the same for men but not for women. In the latter case, lagged and lead consumption, as well as price and income are insigni…cant. For women, except for the OLS estimates, the results are not supportive of the rational addiction model.
In order to check the sensitivity of our results, they performed IV estimation with robust standard errors by round. This is reported for rounds 8 and 11. For round 8, lagged consumption is insigni…cant, but forward consumption is signi…cant for the full sample as well as for men and women. The implied interest rate is negative but insigni…cant for all cases. For the full sample, the short-run and long-run price elasticities at the sample mean are -0.295 and -0.333, but both have large standard errors. For round 11, both forward and lagged consumption are not signi…cant for the full sample, but forward consumption is signi…cant for men, while lagged consumption is signi…cant for women. The implied interest rate is negative but insigni…cant for the full sample, as well as for men, but positive and insigni…cant for women. For the full sample, the short-run and long-run price elasticities at the sample mean are -0.108 and -0.147, but both have large standard errors.
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In sum, the results are sensitive to round by round estimation, and to estimation by gender. The pooled IV results suggest that there is no support for rational addiction in Russia among women. For men, the results are supportive of several implications of the RA model, but overall, we fail to endorse the model empirically on grounds of implausible negative estimates of the discount rate. 
CONCLUSION
The Becker and Murphy (1988) rational addiction theory is elegant and plausible to economists familiar with varying discount rates. It lends itself to a simple empirical model that can be tested with the availability of at least three years of data over several individuals or states. However, empirical application of the RA theory have faced some econometric and data di¢ culties. At the macro state level panel data, the advantages may be the large variation in prices across states. This is due to the di¤ering tax rates among states which account for most of the variation in price. This contrasts to micro panel data on individuals where the variation in price is limited, or hard to come by, and is usually achieved by locating the individual's city or county and obtaining a price for that county or location. This means that the price variation occurs only at the location or county level and not at the individual level. This may hinder proper estimation of price e¤ects and price elasticities important for policy makers attempting to estimate the e¤ect of a tax hike on reducing consumption or raising revenues. One implication of the theory is that long-run price elasticities have to be larger in absolute value than short-run price elasticities. A condition that is generally met in practice with some exceptions. Stability of the second di¤erence equation is important to check and was shown to be a problem for U.S. panel data on state liquor consumption when we run the regressions on a state by state basis or year by year basis. Finding lagged consumption positive and signi…cant seem to be easy to achieve for these addictive commodities, although there were exceptions. Finding future consumption to be positive and signi…cant was also achieved by most empirical studies, but the implied interest rate remain the ‡y in the ointment. Reasonable and signi…cant estimates of the discount rate seem to be a crucial requirement underlying the theoretical model. Imposing prior, so called reasonable discount rates is not a legitimate scienti…c answer in this day and age, especially if we are seriously testing the theory.
